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The Muslim Consensus Undone

Islam, as a universal faith whose adherents will soon number 1 bn, cannot but suffer from tensions created by divisions within. At times this disharmony is in remission, and all Muslims seem to speak with one voice. At other times, the differences seem so profound as to be insurmountable. These divisions today are exacerbated by the lack of one great centre in Islam. There is no single city, State, or body of theologians which enjoys undisputed primacy in determination of political priorities and religious doctrine. There are instead many centres, often exclusive in their claims, pretending to speak on behalf of authentic Islam.

The year 1982 was one in which rival States boasted of their primacy in Islam, after a period during which their differences had been subsumed. Now, each damned the other's policies as incompatible with the true tenets of Islam, and all phrased their own in a Muslim idiom. A heightened sense of religious awareness had failed to unite all Muslims in a common cause. This development precipitated a deadlocked struggle for religious primacy among those who sought political hegemony.

THE YEAR OF DIPLOMACY ENDS

Through the Tā' if Islamic summit conference of January 1981, Saudi Arabia and the Jidda-based Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) had worked to forge a new Muslim consensus under their dual auspices. The summit preparations, the dramatic opening and the conference proceedings, all worked to establish the centrality of Saudi Arabia and the ICO in Muslim diplomacy (see *Middle East Contemporary Survey [MECS]* 1980-81, pp. 127-35). The ICO Secretary-General, Ḥabīb Chatti, was the linchpin of an intensive diplomatic effort closely co-ordinated with the Saudi King Khālid and Crown Prince Fahd. In a little over two years at his post, Chatti claimed to have spent 700 flying hours on official duties.[1] With the aid of this roving Ambassador based in Saudi Arabia, the Saudis claimed to articulate the aspirations of all Muslims.

But by the second half of 1981, some of the key initiatives launched at Tā'if had wound down. The work of the ICO's "good offices" committee, created at the Islamic summit to mediate a settlement of the Iraqi-Iranian war, came to a halt. Chatti had invested 120 of his flying hours in shuttles between Baghdad and Tehran, but with the end of Summer came final word that Iran would not negotiate while Iraqi forces remained on Iranian soil. In early October 1981, Chatti had met the Iranian Foreign Minister, Musavi, in New York to present yet another set of peace proposals already accepted by Iraq.[2] If there were anything new in this plan, it was Iraq's professed willingness to withdraw from Iranian territory, but not prior to the opening of negotiations. Iran, however, insisted that Iraq's withdrawal should not only be unconditional, but must precede any negotiations. "Then we might hold talks," said Iran's President, Khamene'i.[3] Iraq was not prepared to give up its footholds in exchange for this ambivalent promise. With Winter settling in on the war front, Chatti broke off his efforts; he did not resume them for nearly four months. (For the history of ICO mediation in this war, see *MECS* 1980-81, pp. 126-7, 134-5).

On the issue of Palestine, about which the Islamic summit had passed a resolution calling for *jihād,* Chatti led the ICO into a labyrinth of contradictions by embracing Fahd's peace plan. "We have no plan other than the project which was submitted by Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz," Chatti declared in October 1981. "It

is a plan which is based on international legitimacy and on the Arab and Islamic will." Were this plan to lead to the creation of a Palestinian State, Chatti even felt that "co-existence with Israel will be possible."[4] In his opinion this co-existence was consistent with the Islamic summit conference resolutions.[5]

Yet many States which had embraced the Islamic summit resolutions expressed serious opposition to the Saudi plan, belying Chatti's assertion. In late November 1981, Chatti attended the first session of the Fez Arab summit conference which considered the Saudi proposals; there, he regained his caution. He did not openly embrace the Fahd Plan, but spoke only of the "opportunity for a serious move based on a studied and clear plan that secures the consensus of honourable leaders of the Arab nation and the support of all the Islamic nation."[6] (For the various interpretations of the Saudi plan, see essay on the ME peace process; for the first Fez conference, see essay on inter-Arab relations.) After the Saudi setback at Fez, there was little that Chatti could do to aid the Saudi initiative, but keep his silence. Yet this was not without importance. For as long as the Saudi plan remained the subject of critical examination in the West to determine the motives of its sponsors, the theme of *jihād* left over from the Islamic summit had to be muted. Chatti, by choice, pursued a far less aggressive diplomacy than he had conducted over the previous year.

The strain told on Chatti's health, and at the beginning of December 1981 he underwent open-heart surgery in the US.[7] Rumours spread about his retirement, and there was considerable speculation about possible successors.[8] However, the ICO secretariat issued a statement that the surgery was a success, and that Chatti would return to his post in Jidda within a few weeks.[9] Although Chatti eventually returned, for most of the Winter he was completely inactive. As much of the ICO secretariat's diplomacy depended upon his personal initiative, little was heard from the organization during Chatti's convalescence.

THE IRANIAN CHALLENGE

During this pause, Iran organized a challenge to the Saudi bid for Muslim primacy and the ICO's claim to represent a Muslim consensus. It was Khomeyni's position that the Iranian revolution stood at the vanguard of a wider Muslim revolution, and that it alone expressed the genuine aspirations of all Muslims—Shī'ī and Sunnī—for liberation from cultural and political oppression. This conviction created the climate for an intensification of Iran's rivalry with Saudi Arabia, and led it to seek institutions which would serve its own claims just as the ICO served Saudi Arabia's. If, during more than a decade of diplomacy, Saudi Arabia and the ICO had built a broad consensus of States, then Iran claimed to speak authoritatively on behalf of Muslim peoples as distinct from their governments. Khomeyni claimed his constituency among the allegedly oppressed and tyrannized masses. In October 1981, he declared Muslim peoples more receptive to Iran's revolutionary message than their governments, and offered to help the former "take control of their States in their own hands and make it possible for the so-called lower class people to seize administrative power."[10] In the past it had been Iran's position that Islamic revolution would spread through spontaneous emulation. There would be no direct Iranian interference in the domestic affairs of other States. Now Khomeyni signalled that he was prepared to modify this policy, and somehow aid the revolutionary process.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1981

In Iranian revolutionary theory, the annual pilgrimage at Mecca, not conferences of diplomats, constituted the representative forum for the exchange of ideas

among aware Muslims. In this view, pilgrimage was a genuinely popular expression of Muslim solidarity, a great rally of the disinherited. The idea found expression in the theoretical works of one of the revolution's foremost intellectual precursors, 'Alī Shari'ati, an Iranian sociologist, instructor and prolific author who died shortly before the revolution. In his widely read tract on pilgrimage, Shari'ati advocated a two or three-day stay in Minā immediately after the closing feast of 'Īd al-Aḍḥā for pilgrims "to study the dangers and conspiracies of the Super Powers and their agents who have infiltrated Muslim nations. They should make resolutions to fight against brainwashing, propaganda, disunity, heresy, false religions."[11] As the first pilgrimage following the revolution approached, Ayatollah Montazeri, later Khomeyni's presumed successor, lent official support to this position. "In Mecca," he told departing Iranian pilgrims in September 1979, "Muslims from various countries gather together to convene an Islamic conference, so that Muslims may be informed about each other's conditions. There you can meet Muslims from Lebanon, Muslims from Palestine, Afghan Muslims, Muslims from the Philippines, from Thailand, from the Soviet Union, Muslims from all over the world. You meet them, you talk to them, you ask them what their needs are, what their problems are, what kind of assistance they need. This is the philosophy of pilgrimage. If you can, you give them assistance; if they can, they render you assistance."[12] Pilgrimage was an act of communion not only with God but with fellow men.

This was a controversial proposition, for the Saudi guardians of the holy cities traditionally had set another tone for the pilgrimage. It was not for the arbitrarily assembled masses of pilgrims to exchange political ideas, pass resolutions and pledge mutual assistance. This was the business of Muslim governments and the multilateral organizations which united them. Partly to satisfy the demand of outspoken Muslims from abroad to express themselves during the pilgrimage, Saudi authorities in 1962 had established the Muslim World League (MWL; *rābitat al-'ālam al-islāmī*—on the MWL, see below). The constituent assembly of this organization, under the watchful guidance of a Saudi Secretary-General, met annually in Mecca to gather Muslim activists from abroad who shared Saudi political perspectives. But this unofficial body by custom concluded its deliberations before the commencement of the pilgrimage month. Thus, the constituent assembly ended its annual session and issued its political resolutions for 1981 in late September, just as Mecca began to fill with pilgrims.[13] There was also a custom of half a century's standing that the Saudi King address leading pilgrims concerning the state of the world's Muslims. In recent years, this address usually amounted to the briefest outline of Saudi foreign policy, with an emphasis on Muslim causes. King Khālid adhered to this precedent in his address to pilgrims for the 1981 season.[14] In the Saudi view, it was essential to preserve the pilgrimage as a religious rite; political discourse in the holy cities in the midst of the observances was inadmissible.

The encounter at Mecca and Medina of two conflicting visions of pilgrimage set the scene for confrontation. During the pilgrimage of seasons 1979 and 1980, some Iranian pilgrims worked to disseminate views very different from those of their hosts. According to the Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Nā'if Ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz, his country's security organs had in both years discovered photographs, leaflets, and gatherings "which had nothing to do with pilgrimage."[15] These were evidently photographs of Ayatollah Khomeyni, and gatherings of the sort prescribed by Ayatollah Montazeri.

As the 1981 pilgrimage season approached, Saudi authorities took steps to prevent the recurrence of similar episodes. The Interior Ministry issued a ban on

the import by pilgrims of all books, photographs and leaflets of a political or ideological nature.[16] Information Ministry officials set up divisions to inspect printed, recorded and videotaped materials at ports of entry;[17] but the most important step was to negotiate with Iranian officials to ensure that they instruct their pilgrims to show self-restraint. A delegation headed by the Iranian Islamic Guidance Minister, Ḥujjat al-Islam Ma'adikhah, visited Saudi Arabia in August 1981 to discuss technical arrangements for the pilgrimage, and it is possible that the subject was raised then.[18] An understanding seemed to have been reached. The Iranian embassy in Jidda informed the Saudi Foreign Ministry that Khomeyni had instructed Iranian pilgrims to "make an effort to realize solidarity among Muslims, to refrain from divisive acts, to follow congregational prayer leaders while conducting prayers in mosques, and to follow the decree concerning the observation of the first moon of the [pilgrimage] month of Dhū al-Ḥijja in Saudi Arabia, even if it had not been established that the moon had been seen in Iran."[19] Iran claimed that, in turn, it had received Saudi consent that buses rented by the Iranian Government for its pilgrims be marked with the Iranian flag and bear Khomeyni's portrait.[20]

But this understanding left much unspoken. In his message to "the world's Muslims and pilgrims" in early September 1981, Khomeyni set this tone for the season: "The obligation of the pilgrimage, among other divine obligations, has particular characteristics, and its social and political aspects are perhaps more prominent than others, even though it also has a special characteristic as an act of worship." Pilgrimage came to promote a unity among Muslims impeded above all by "some of the so-called leaders of Islamic countries." These "raise a ballyhoo and at every opportunity propose a fresh plan to bring about differences in order to destroy the unity of Muslims at its foundation. They have recently been blowing their propaganda trumpets with despicable slander about relations between Iran and Israel and about arms purchases. This is aimed at driving a wedge between Iran and the Arabs and at bringing about enmity among Muslims in order to pave the way for the Super Powers to further increase their domination." Under these circumstances, did committed Muslims "not regard it as their obligation to support the Iranian Government who have, with their holy crusade, thrown down the banner of blasphemy and raised the glorious banner of Islam?"[21] Saudi authorities were reported to have been put still further on edge when Iran's Islamic Guidance Minister announced that some of Iran's departing pilgrims "may have played a role in seizing the American embassy in Tehran" in 1979. Unnamed sources in Tehran even reported that these veterans of the siege would arrive disguised and armed.[22]

The unfolding events made for the most unsettled pilgrimage in nearly 60 years of Saudi guardianship over the holy cities of Islam. The source of unrest lay in the 75,000 Iranian pilgrims, and their activities raised the question of Iranian official involvement. These were the principal incidents:

- During September 1981, 80 Iranians were denied entry when Saudi border officials discovered materials in their possession expressly forbidden by the Saudi ban.[23]
- On the night of 22-23 September 1981, a group of early Iranian arrivals congregated inside the Prophet's Mosque in Medina and began chanting "God is great" in what a Saudi Interior Ministry statement described as "loud and annoying voices and in a manner unworthy of the holiness of the sanctuary." A violent altercation followed between Saudi soldiers and the pilgrims, resulting in injuries to both sides and a number of arrests.[24]
- An Iranian source reported that on the night of 1 October 1981 Iranian pil-

grims in the Great Mosque at Mecca held mourning services in memory of Iranian military commanders who had fallen in the war against Iraq. On this occasion, Saudi police in riot gear were reported to have entered the Grand Mosque to preserve order.[25] Saudi religious functionaries at Friday congregational prayers on 2 October rose to the challenge, preaching that political activity would render a pilgrim's religious rites null and void.[26] In a televised interview on 3 October, the Saudi Interior Minister, Prince Nā'if spoke of practices "alien" to the pilgrimage. He said that the authorities had given full warning "that Muslims should not bring political publications or pictures of any leaders with them and that they should not perform any political activity, because these practices contradict the pilgrim's duties." Now there would be no leniency. "We hope we will not have to resort to certain measures. However, if we are forced to use them we will do anything to put an end to such practices."[27]

- Radio Tehran claimed that on 4 October 1981, 1m pilgrims marched through Mecca to the Grand Mosque. Iranian demonstrators, joined by pilgrims from several other countries, carried Iranian flags and portraits of Khomeyni. According to this source, attempts by Saudi police and security personnel to halt the march failed.[28] But the Saudi Interior Ministry maintained that its report was totally untrue. "What actually happened . . . was an attempted action by a group of undisciplined Iranian pilgrims, but the security forces prevented this." Mecca, crowded with pilgrims, was an open city; "should anything like that have taken place, everybody would have known about it."[29] On the same day, the Iranian Islamic Guidance Minister arrived in Mecca, and in a message to the Saudi Interior Minister he asked whether it was not possible "that there are some Muslims in Iran and other countries who may have certain concepts about the pilgrimage and the pilgrims' tasks contrary to your assertions?" He proposed that the Saudi Government "allow our point of view concerning the pilgrimage to be presented in detail by your Press, radio and television. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is willing to publicize your viewpoints concerning the pilgrimage without omitting a single word in its Press, radio and television."[30] Nā'if did not reply to this message.
- On 5 October, King Khālid wrote to Ayatollah Khomeyni concerning the activities of Iranian pilgrims, which apparently had reached disturbing dimensions. After citing the earlier commitments conveyed by the Iranian embassy in Jidda to the Saudi Foreign Ministry, Khālid gave examples of acts "contrary to the aims of the pilgrimage." He revealed that a large crowd of Iranian pilgrims, while performing the circumambulation *(tawāf)* in the Great Mosque in Mecca, had begun to chant slogans. Some of these were in praise of Khomeyni, in formulae that bordered on the blasphemous. Having thus caused "dissatisfaction and disgust" among other pilgrims, the Iranians were arrested, but were then released as evidence of Saudi Arabia's good intentions. Khālid now appealed to Khomeyni to order Iranian pilgrims to desist from similar acts. "We are sure that the Iranian pilgrims would honour and obey Your Excellency's orders."[31]

  No such order was issued by Khomeyni, who replied to Khālid by letter on 10 October 1981. The tone was censorious. The Prophet Muḥammad himself had planned wars and formulated policy in the mosques of Mecca and Medina. Why had the situation "now reached a point that involvement in political and social affairs—which is very necessary and is among the most important duties of Muslims—is regarded as an offence in the two holy mosques? How is it that the Saudi police attack Muslims with jackboots and

weapons, beat them, arrest them, and send them to prison from inside the holy mosque, a place which according to the teachings of God and the text of the Qur'ān, is refuge for all, even deviates?" Saudi treatment of Iranian pilgrims had evoked "the hatred and dissatisfaction of Muslims throughout the world." The sole offence of these pilgrims had been to chant slogans against America and Israel, "enemies of God and the Prophet." As for other slogans, Khālid had been misinformed as to their contents.[32] The only compromising gesture made by Khomeyni was to postpone his reply until after the culminating day of "standing" *(wuqūf)* at Mount 'Arafāt near Mecca, which fell on 7 October 1981, and which was observed by nearly 2m pilgrims. In this episode, the Iranian Majlis Speaker, Rafsanjani, found evidence of "the inability of Saudi leaders to resolve their problems and their need to resort to asking for our help."[33]

- Radio Tehran reported that after midday prayers in Mecca on 11 October, a group of Iranians and other pilgrims were arrested for chanting slogans.[34] Iranian sources also announced that on 12 October another demonstration took place in Mecca, and there were a number of arrests. The demonstrators distributed copies of Khomeyni's reply to Khālid.[35]
- Radio Tehran claimed that on 16 October, several Iranian pilgrims were wounded and arrested by Saudi security forces who had expelled them from the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. "Thousands" of Iranians in Medina then spontaneously demonstrated in protest against the action. According to this source, the demonstrators dispersed only after Saudi officials apologized to Iranian officials and promised to release imprisoned pilgrims.[36] The Saudi Interior Ministry responded that Iranians in the mosque had "tried to create confusion and chaos," were arrested and ordered to be deported. Saudi officials denied having offered any apologies.[37] Several weeks later, Iran announced the death in Tehran of a named pilgrim who allegedly suffered injuries in the Prophet's Mosque at the hands of the Saudi police.[38]

The actual incidents appear to have had the character of spontaneous outbursts, but Radio Tehran's Arabic service gave them extensive and sympathetic coverage, compelling the Saudi Interior Ministry to issue a series of defensive statements. The Iranian Islamic Guidance Minister played an equivocal role, offering the Saudi authorities assurances at one moment and issuing challenges the next; and Ayatollah Khomeyni himself, in his reply to King Khālid, gave full sanction to the political activism of the Iranian pilgrims.

At issue was something of fundamental interest to the Iranian State. If Saudi Arabia's claim to primacy in Islam was to be challenged, it was essential first to deprive the Saudis of whatever prestige had accrued to them as guardians of Mecca and Medina. According to Ma'adikhah, "Saudi officials—since the key to the Grand Mosque is in their hands—imagine that all Muslims have to imitate them and succomb to them. This is a meaningless expectation . . . The Ka'ba—as is clearly stated in the Qur'ān—is for all Muslims, even if the worst relations exist between us and Saudi Arabia."[39] These relations reached their nadir the following month when Khomeyni declared in an *ex cathedra* manner that "whosoever supports the Fahd Plan is a traitor to Islam."[40] (On the pilgrimage season of 1982, see below.)

TECHNIQUES OF PERSUASION

Iran's success in unsettling the pilgrimage, however dramatic, represented a challenge which it was not yet in a position to pursue for Tehran lacked the instruments necessary to promote the cause of Islamic revolution among Muslim

peoples elsewhere. The revolutionary regime had few media for the dissemination of its fundamental message. The Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic (VVIR)—Iran's state-controlled radio and television—did supervise an international service; and since the outbreak of the war with Iraq, Radio Tehran's Arabic transmissions had been expanded to 17 hours a day. There were also daily hour-long broadcasts from Tehran in Turkish, Urdu, Pashto and Russian, extolling Iran's revolutionary patronage of the cause of Islam and the oppressed.[41] The potential of this medium and its limits were established in the pilgrimage polemics with Saudi Arabia.

Iran otherwise had few of the tools essential to a bid for Muslim primacy. There were various Iranian publications in Arabic, Urdu and Turkish, but these were of very uneven quality. The most important were *al-Shahīd*, an Arabic and Urdu periodical; and *Sawt al-Umma*, the Arabic organ of the Islamic Guidance Ministry. Islamic Guidance Minister Ma'adikhah offered a commentary on these when he complained that one reason "for our weak publicity abroad is that we lacked good publications with high circulation worth speaking about, so far. We should investigate this lack. We should allocate more funds in this field. We have failed to do this."[42] Nor was there an efficient framework for dispensing assistance to those already won over to the cause of Islamic revolution in other countries. When Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister was asked, late in 1981, whether Iran had extended actual aid to revolutionaries elsewhere, he replied: "Iran today is waging a war against the ruling regime in Baghdad and indirectly against America. Millions of dollars of our deprived people's funds are expended daily at the fronts, and each day a number of our youth fall in defence of Islam. Therefore, the assistance which we can give to these revolutions and movements is limited." Iran's example would have to suffice.[43]

Iran did shelter political exiles from various Muslim States, and some were assisted in publishing periodicals in Iran for distribution in their own countries. But there was little evidence of more active assistance. Iran's diplomatic missions abroad showed little initiative in this field. Ma'adikhah admitted in January 1982 that "We have done little about our embassies abroad because we have not supervised them at close quarters. On the other hand, some people did not allow us to have an organized Foreign Affairs Ministry. It is only during the last few months that Iranian officials have started programming this Ministry."[44] This reflected the conviction that Iran's Foreign Ministry, under a series of Ministers who were later discredited, remained an unreliable arm of the revolution. Khomeyni believed that in the field of propaganda, "our embassies have not done anything positive."[45] There was little relief in sight, as few persons combined diplomatic skills with the ideological commitment demanded by the Foreign Ministry's critics. Naive enthusiasm was not sufficient. This was evident in the December 1981 adventures of a guileless Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in North Yemen who was asked to leave the country within 48 hours because he had been caught distributing leaflets in the streets of San'ā. Perhaps more embarrassing was the fact that he had already been summoned to the North Yemeni Foreign Ministry several times to answer for similar activities.[46] The skills of persuasion required of an Iranian diplomat in this foreign capital evidently were not those which had sufficed on the street corners and campuses of Tehran.

This was the backdrop to the events which were to have toppled the Bahraini Government on 16 December 1981, Bahrain's national day. Shortly before the holiday, a number of Bahraini and other Gulf nationals, "who came from Iran to Bahrain . . . to seek to create anarchy and spread fear," were arrested there. Bahrain protested to Iran, but Iran denied all Bahraini allegations. (For a detailed account, see section on Bahrain in the chapter on the Gulf States.)

It was difficult to establish the precise extent of Iranian official involvement in the plot. Among the various activists in Tehran named in this connection was Ḥujjat al-Islam Hadi Modarresi, a Shī'ī cleric who had been declared *persona non grata* and deported by Bahraini authorities shortly after Iran's revolution. Around him there had formed a group known as the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, headquartered in Tehran. According to Bahraini sources, Modarresi was to all intents and purposes an Iranian official, and director of a bureau created to undermine the Arab governments of the Gulf.[47] According to confessions of the conspirators, Radio Tehran would have been placed at his disposal to aid in incitement to insurrection.[48]

Whether Iran was a willing or an unwitting accomplice, the foiled coup highlighted a growing Iranian tactlessness. Saudi security authorities had aided the Bahrainis in cracking the conspiracy, the existence of which they said they had first inferred from Iranian radio broadcasts and statements by Iranian officials.[49] Patronage extended to exile groups and the free hand given to Tehran's Arabic service had created the impression that Iran had moved to a policy of outright subversion. This, in turn, drove the Gulf States into a tighter Saudi embrace. "Prior to the events in Bahrain," the Saudi Interior Minister, Nā'if, said "we were about to sign a security agreement with Bahrain. Signing that agreement could have continued to be subject to priorities without a definite time for its endorsement. However, following the discovery of what had taken place in Bahrain, the Bahraini Interior Minister contacted me and I myself was about to contact him in order to speed up the signing of the agreement and do it immediately."[50] Iran had paid the price for someone's undisciplined revolutionary zeal, perhaps its own.

At the same time, Iran sought further pretexts for confrontation with Saudi Arabia. In late November 1981, one of Saudi Arabia's leading religious authorities, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Azīz Ibn Bāz, issued a denunciation of the widespread practice of celebrating the Prophet Muḥammad's birthday. In a *fatwa* (a ruling of religious law), Shaykh Ibn Bāz determined that "God has not decreed for us any birthday celebrations, either for the Prophet or for anyone else," and urged Muslims to abandon this "heretical innovation."[51] His was a position in accord with certain schools of fundamentalist and reformist opinion, which regard the marking of the Prophet's birthday as a late development and a compromise of the monotheistic principles of Islam.[52]

Observance of the Prophet's birthday is nonetheless widespread in the Muslim world. In many States it is recognized as an official holiday. Against this background, Ayatollah Montazeri issued a directive to Ma'adikhah that observance of the Prophet's birthday should be championed by Iran through sponsorship of a week of unity "so that co-ordination be achieved with the other Muslims, and with the Divine Will the voice of the Islamic revolution of the heroic nation of Iran be heard by the deprived and oppressed world inside and outside the country and by arranging full programmes."[53] The events were scheduled for 8-13 January 1982 to coincide with two different birthdates of the Prophet—one recognized by Sunnīs, and the other by Shī'īs. Of the ruling by Shaykh Ibn Bāz, Khomeyni had this to say: "This mullah is a lackey of the Saudi Arabian court and wants to implement the King's wishes; therefore, he stands against Muslims and makes such remarks. Is it blasphemy to respect the apostle of God? Does this mullah understand the meaning of blasphemy?" Shaykh Ibn Bāz was "extremely ignorant" of Islam.[54] This charge constituted a direct challenge to the claim of a senior Saudi authority to define the principles of Islam for all Muslims. It was part of a wider Iranian repudiation of Saudi *'ulamā'*, mentioned with contempt in the Iranian media as "preachers" *(wu'āz)* and "court clerics" *('ulamā' al-balāt)*.

The Prophet's birthday was to be celebrated by delegations coming from other Muslim countries as well as from towns throughout Iran, at a conference in Tehran, which would stress the unity of Islam. An Iranian cleric explained to the delegations that other Islamic conferences "had been held to reach this goal in the past. The MWL was established, and so were other institutions which have raised the slogan of Islamic unity. But these did not achieve any goal on the practical plane . . . because they were founded on the desire to achieve quick results rather than study the objective circumstances which surround us."[55]

But the circumstances surrounding the conference served only to emphasize the limits of Iran's influence abroad. The conference hall was not full. No notable foreign participants were present, and the only speeches reported in the Press were those delivered by Iranians. Delegations of unnamed persons from "various Muslim lands including Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, the Philippines, Malaysia and Pakistan," were reported to have visited Khomeyni at his residence; he addressed these anonymous admirers on the need for Muslim unity.[56] But all these events went unnoticed beyond Iran. This episode showed how little developed Iran's links were with influential Muslim figures and organizations abroad. Without such a supportive network, Iranians remained the only ones to assert their country's primacy in Islam.

Iran thus stood to celebrate the third anniversary of the Islamic revolution virtually alone. The Islamic Guidance Minister, Ma'adikhah, took an initiative to ensure that this event would not also pass unnoticed in the rest of the Muslim world. He had already prepared an ambitious plan to propagate Iran's message, which would co-ordinate the activities of the Islamic Guidance Ministry, the Foreign Ministry and the VVIR.[57] For the anniversary, which fell in February 1982, Ma'adikhah organized numerous "Islamic information missions," which were dispatched to various Muslim States and communities abroad.[58] Many of these missions were headed by leading clerics. Ma'adikhah considered this step "a late and short-time plan for publicity."[59] Khomeyni then entrusted him with the implementation of his more ambitious plan, appointing him to serve as official co-ordinator of Iran's foreign propaganda.[60] This would reduce the scope left for unsupervised initiatives in the dissemination of Iran's Islamic message by independent clerics, political exiles and inexperienced diplomats.

At the same time, Iran began to seek ways to integrate a more constructive theme in its claim to centrality. In the Spring of 1982, President Khameneh'i launched an appeal for an Islamic common market. His call was amplified by the Prime Minister and other Ministers.[61] The Prime Minister, Musavi, declared that "building a common basis in economic and commercial issues among Muslim countries will enable them to attain their true role. . . . We must expand our economic and cultural exchanges with Muslim countries in order to be able to explain to the Muslims of the world our peaceful intentions." The Commerce Minister, 'Askar-Owladi, announced that "the Government had come to believe that in order to be independent of foreigners both in regard to the country's Islamic revolution and to the Muslim nations of the world, we must move toward the creation of an Islamic common market. . . . . I should say that within one year we will be able to trade most of the non-industrial goods in the Islamic common market and, in this way . . . foodstuffs, clothing and many industrial raw materials complement each other." The Foreign Minister, Velayati, said that "creating economic relations between ourselves and Syria, Turkey and countries such as Algeria and Libya and other Islamic countries can, in fact, be a first practical nucleus of a common market." The countries concerned, he said, had welcomed his plan.[62] Iran thus promised a challenge to Saudi Arabia and the new ICO-

sponsored Islamic Centre for the Development of Trade. But it was uncertain where, in the wide range between subversion and economic co-operation, Iran would expend its greater efforts.

LOSING MUSLIM SUPPORT

The strengthening of ties with Libya and Syria lost Iran the sympathy of some Muslim activists who had initially supported the revolution. The antagonism shared by Iran and Libya to Saudi policies had made for a mutual attraction. (For Libya's exchange with Saudi Arabia, see below.) There was some speculation that these two States might become the core of a Muslim coalition opposed to the ICO. The most practical initiative in this regard was the Iranian plan to combine with Libya in creating an Islamic news agency, which would rival the ICO-affiliated International Islamic News Agency.[63]

But one issue cast a shadow on this emerging coalition: the unknown fate of Imam Mūsā al-Sadr, the spiritual leader of Lebanese Shī'ī Muslims who disappeared in August 1978 while on a trip to Libya. Many Lebanese Shī'īs continued to reject the Libyan claim that Sadr had boarded a plane for Rome, and to believe that he was either dead or alive in Libya, as a victim or prisoner of the Libyan regime. The demand that Libya reveal his fate was the motive for two airliner hijackings by Lebanese Shī'īs, one of a Libyan plane in December 1981, and the other of a Kuwaiti flight which had originated in Libya in February 1982. Lebanese Shī'ī leaders did not support these acts. But Nabīh al-Barrī, leader of the Lebanese Shī'ī militia, believed Sadr to be alive in Libya.[64] The *muftī* of the Lebanese Shī'ī community, Shaykh 'Abd al-Amīr Qabalān, also remained convinced that Libya was responsible for Sadr's disappearance.[65] Libya's problem now became Iran's. Shaykh Qabalān was reported to have declared on one occasion in the presence of the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in Beirut that "if Imam Khomeyni does not return Imam Mūsā al-Sadr to us, his way is different from ours, and his God is different from our God."[66]

With the deepening of Libyan-Iranian relations, Iran found the Lebanese Shī'ī claim inconvenient. When Ayatollah Khalkhali visited Libya in March 1980, he had accepted the Libyan version and blamed Sadr's disappearance on a Zionist-Imperialist conspiracy (see *MECS* 1979-80, p. 640). But this version did not satisfy leading Lebanese Shī'īs, and Iran paid a price for its Libyan alliance in its own backyard of Muslim influence.

Iran's alignment with Syria did not sit well with Sunnī Muslim activists of the Muslim Brotherhood variety; they were offended by Iran's continued support of Syria during the Ḥamāh siege (see chapter on Syria). The road to disillusionment was described in a Kuwaiti activist periodical. Certain Sunnī Muslim groups had made contact with Khomeyni's circle while he was still in exile, and had welcomed the Iranian revolution in their periodicals. Others had lost jobs or been harassed for their vocal support of Iran's Islamic aspirations. After Khomeyni's triumph, representatives of these groups had joined together in a single delegation to visit Tehran in September 1979. Khomeyni received them with assurances of repaid support. But such assistance as Iran gave, as in Afghanistan, was limited and conditional. The priority accorded by Iran to the Syrian relationship was especially painful. The publishers of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood periodical *al-Nadhīr* had fruitlessly sought a reconciliation.[67] Iran's alignment with Syria thus carried with it a hidden cost.

LIBYA'S ISLAMIC CALL

Libya's dispute with Saudi Arabia (cf. essay on inter-Arab relations) continued to find expression in a Muslim idiom. Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhāfī enforced within

Libya a highly personal brand of Islam as state doctrine, often offering his theological insights on the occasion of religious festivals. He had in recent years advanced a series of unconventional religious precepts which were designed to cast him in the role of a visionary desert puritan. He declared one of the traditional sources of Islamic law—the major canonical collections of the Prophet Muḥammad's deeds and sayings—to be unreliable and invalid, and so dismissed a centuries-long tradition of jurisprudence. Instead, he argued for a strict scripturalism reliant solely upon his interpretation of the text of the Qur'ān. He rejected the dating of the Islamic calendar from the Prophet's passage *(hijra)* from Mecca to Medina, preferring the later date of Muḥammad's death. Libyan official documents and newspapers thereafter bore an Islamic date a decade at variance with the date current in every other quarter of the Muslim world. These acts constituted challenges to established sources of religious authority beyond Libya. In the prevailing climate, such ostensibly theological differences fused with the political differences that divided the rival regimes of Libya and Saudi Arabia.

"Has Islam an enemy worse than Saudi Arabia?" This remained the thrust of Qadhdhāfī's verbal offensive against the Saudi claim to primacy in Islam. (For the opening of polemics in this vein, see *MECS* 1980-81, p. 127). The most controversial theme in this challenge was Qadhdhāfī's assertion that "the liberation of Saudi Arabia is more important than the performance of the pilgrimage at the present time."[68] These and similar comments had evoked Saudi rebuttals in the past, but in March 1982 they inspired an unprecedented response from the senior council of Saudi *'ulamā'*. Their statement proclaimed that Saudi Arabia was "the great bastion of Islam and Muslims," ruled by the principles of the *sharī'a* and committed to the spread of Islam; but Qadhdhāfī, motivated by "hatred and envy," had "insulted the people who spread Islam and the *'ulamā'* who have upheld this religion." Their statement went on to say that because of Qadhdhāfī's "renunciation of the tradition of the Prophet . . . and his ridicule of the pilgrimage, his belittling of some of the teachings of Islam, and his sinister and invalid tendencies, this man is a heretic *(kāfir)* and misguided." Among the signatories were Shaykh 'Abd al-'Azīz Ibn Bāz and the MWL Secretary-General, Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alī al-Ḥarakān.[69] This statement amounted to a declaration of excommunication. A retaliatory Libyan radio commentary termed the signatories "a corrupt clique, filthy instruments, sinful subnormals . . . [who] trade in religion and sell licences for practising what is prohibited *(ḥaram)* to the rulers of the Saudi family."[70]

Qadhdhāfī, in a May 1982 address marking the Prophet Muḥammad's nocturnal ascent *(al-isrā' wa'l-mi'rāj)*, formulated the Libyan challenge as a specific demand for the internationalization of Islam's holy cities. This was not simply a repudiation of Saudi pilgrimage policy, but of Saudi sovereignty over precincts sacred to all Muslims: "I call for placing holy Mecca and Medina under the Islamic administration of all Islamic nations. It is not permissible for the house of God [the Grand Mosque in Mecca] to remain under the political control of any one State. The House of God is for all believers. Therefore, we must earnestly start action right now to remove the Saudi political domination from the sacred House of God, even if this is to be accomplished by way of *jihād*."[71] Libya also publicized the cases of two pilgrims, a Libyan and an Egyptian, who had been arrested by the Saudi authorities in November 1980 and were still in custody. According to Libya, the ICO Secretary-General had been unable to determine the reasons for their arrest or secure their release. In the Libyan view, this established the failure of Saudi authorities to respect Mecca as a sanctuary.[72]

Qadhdhāfī later moved to create an institutional framework for his bid to displace Saudi Arabia. The Islamic Call Society *(jam'iyyat al-da'wa al-islāmiyya)* convened a conference in Tripoli from 14-19 August 1982, of c. 400 overseas

Muslim activists. The Society, established in 1970, was the instrument for disseminating Qadhdhāfī's vision of Islam beyond Libya's frontiers. It was active abroad in the construction of Islamic centres and mosques, the publishing of Qur'āns and religious books, and the training and dispatch of Muslim missionaries. In 1982 the Society's Secretary-General, Aḥmad al-Sharīf, went as far afield as China in pursuit of Muslims wanting spiritual guidance.[73]

Qadhdhāfī called upon the society to displace the Mecca-based MWL, which "carried out the orders of the Saudi princes."[74] He told participants in the society's conference that "this gathering aims at setting up a world council for the Islamic call instead of remaining a purely Libyan Islamic call. This council is to include all the various Islamic societies, bodies and organizations."[75] The conference therefore resolved to set up a world council *(majlis 'ālamī li'l-da'wa al-islāmiyya)*, which would act as an executive body for the society's conference. The conference would meet every four years, and elect the 36 member council, which would then meet once a year in Tripoli. This rudimentary structure bore a resemblance to the rival MWL (see below), which Qadhdhāfī meant to displace. Among the members of the first council were directors of Islamic centres and associations in countries where Muslims were in the minority, who had received Libyan aid in the past.[76]

Qadhdhāfī's speech to the conference articulated Libya's challenge. Libya, he claimed, was "more concerned about the conditions of Muslims than any other Islamic or Arab State"; in contrast, Saudi Arabia was ruled by Kings and Princes who gambled and drank. "Each Prince owns an oilfield and a number of barrels. Is this Islam? This reflects [badly] on Islam. Therefore, any of you who cherishes Islam must surely declare *jihād* against this bad example that harms Islam. . . . In fact *jihād* should be declared in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Sudan—and this is your task." Qadhdhāfī then returned to his specific demand concerning the holy cities. The Saudis allowed American AWACS planes to fly over Mecca and Medina, "through the sky from which [the Archangel] Gabriel descended, from whom came [the Prophet Muḥammad's] inspiration." No one State should rule these cities, Qadhdhāfī insisted, and no Muslim should require a passport or visa to enter them.[77]

The conference resolutions, however, directed no criticism at any Muslim State; they simply affirmed that "Mecca should be accessible to everyone and no authority should ever obstruct the path of a Muslim to holy Mecca." Some of the participants were known not to share Qadhdhāfī's view of the Saudi menace, and they argued for moderation. Apparently a compromise was reached by which the conference agreed to consider Qadhdhāfī's speech an "official document," while the formal resolutions remained confined to the themes of Zionist and American aggression. The fact that the delegates urged that their resolutions be communicated to the ICO also indicated that the organizers and participants wished to win broader recognition for their new world council. An ICO official responsible for Muslim minority affairs was actually in attendance, and he was elected to the world council.[78] Whether the resolutions had disappointed or pleased Qadhdhāfī was not known; nor is it known how much material support Qadhdhāfī has pledged to the world council.

EGYPT'S LEAGUE IN ECLIPSE

In his last year, Anwar al-Sādāt had sought to alleviate an Egyptian sense of isolation through the creation of the Cairo-based League of Islamic and Arab Peoples. The close involvement of the League in selected Muslim causes abroad was intended to make up for Egypt's suspension from the ICO in May 1979 as a

reprisal for Sādāt's signing of a peace accord with Israel. (On the emergence of the League, see *MECS* 1980–81, pp. 122, 135-6, and essay on inter-Arab relations.)

Following Sādāt's assassination, his successor Ḥusnī Mubārak accelerated a movement toward reconciliation with those who had broken with Egypt over Sādāt's peace initiative. As a small step toward a possible reconciliation, Mubārak suspended the presidential patronage which Sādāt had lavished on the League of Islamic and Arab Peoples. The approach of the third session of the League's constituent assembly, scheduled for 27 December 1981 (the third anniversary of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan), presented Mubārak with an opportunity to give effect to his new policy. Following discussions between Mubārak and the League Secretary-General, Sayyid Nawfal, it was announced that the session had been postponed indefinitely.[79] The League did sponsor a day of solidarity with the Afghan people on 27 December. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, Kamāl Ḥasan 'Alī, and Shaykh al-Azhar 'Abd al-Raḥmān Baysār attended, but Mubārak's absence was notable. The event was a shadow of the solidarity week in which Sādāt had played so prominent a part the previous year.[80]

However, Egypt's religious establishment still felt itself entitled to define the faith for the wider Muslim world, even if it had failed to do so for all of Egypt. Throughout the country there were only 3,000 state-employed *imāms* for 6,000 state-run mosques, while another 40,000 private mosques were beyond state supervision.[81] In this climate, extreme interpretations of Islam had emerged to rival those articulated by Egypt's religious establishment (see chapter on Egypt). Yet, while so many mosque pulpits in Egypt went unsupervised, 20% of all qualified *imāms* in state employ were on loan to other Muslim countries and Islamic centres in Europe and America.[82] Without this network, the field would have been left to Saudi, Libyan, and even Iranian, initiatives; but the effort entailed a very real domestic cost.

In March 1982, Shaykh al-Azhar 'Abd al-Raḥmān Baysār died at the age of 71. Throughout his career Shaykh Baysār had shared the expansive approach to al-Azhar's role in the Muslim world, and had himself served for four years as director of the prestigious Islamic Centre in Washington. During the last year of his life, he had visited Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, always speaking of closer co-operation and the dispatch of Egyptian missionaries.[83] Baysār's successor as Shaykh al-Azhar, Jādd al-Ḥaqq 'Alī Jādd al-Ḥaqq, issued a statement upon his appointment in which he promised essentially to continue Baysār's policies.[84]

SPREADING SAUDI ISLAM

While the challenges accumulated, the Saudis continued their prolific organizational efforts to disseminate their vision of Islam. Only when directly provoked (as by Libya; see above) did they retaliate against critics of their pretension to supremacy in Muslim affairs. When left alone, they laboured methodically to build a network of Muslim affiliations which they believed would establish their authority to represent all Muslims.

THE MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE

The favoured instrument of influence was, in many instances, the Mecca-based and Saudi financed MWL. In 20 years, the MWL had constructed an extensive network of connections around the core of a constituent council which met annually in Mecca before the pilgrimage. The council was composed of senior Saudi *'ulamā'* and like-minded Muslim activists from abroad. In 1982 they numbered 60 persons, who met each year to pass resolutions and divide a substantial budget

provided by the Saudi State. The funds aided mosques, Islamic centres, educational institutions, and Qur'ān distribution throughout the world.

The MWL published a monthly periodical, *Majallat Rābitat al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, and a weekly newspaper, *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*. With the passage of time, the MWL generated its own specialized agencies, with their own secretariats and periodic conferences. To keep abreast of its expanding activities, the MWL then opened offices in New York, Paris, and other foreign cities. Representing the MWL in the field were 350 *imāms* and missionaries appointed to mosques and missions all over the world. A bureau was to be established in Mecca to study the monthly reports which they submitted, and to co-ordinate their activities.[85] The latest expansion came in the field of publishing. In October 1982, the MWL Secretary-General, Shaykh Muḥammad 'Alī al-Ḥarakān, formally inaugurated the organization's own publishing house in Mecca. Newly constructed and equipped, it cost SR12m.[86] The MWL was perhaps the largest Muslim missionary enterprise; the view of Islam which it disseminated was in all respects Saudi.

The MWL's calendar consisted of a series of gatherings of invited Muslims, convened periodically at Saudi expense to discuss religious and political issues. Shaykh Ḥarakān was asked whether there was any real yield from these many Islamic conferences. "You are not the first to question and complain about the numerous Islamic conferences . . . I say to you and to the others that it is sufficient if those active in Islamic missionary institutions meet one another, that we learn about one another's problems, and become aware of their many dimensions."[87] Important therefore was the cumulative effect, not individual events on the calendar. Yet, two conferences were particularly noteworthy in 1981 for their settings.

The first met in Paris from 16-18 November 1981, and gathered directors of European Islamic centres and mosques. These institutions, set in large European cities, were highly visible, and the Muslim communities which they served were by nature heterogeneous and cosmopolitan. For this reason, they often attracted offers of financial support and religious guidance from rival Muslim States. One of the most important institutions supported by Saudi largesse was the Centre Islamique et Culturel de Belgique in Brussels. Saudi support of the Centre had been generous in recent years, allowing the completion of a new building.[88]

Through the Brussels Centre, the MWL worked to organize a continental council of European mosques and centres which enjoyed Saudi financial support. The council had been founded in Brussels in November 1980. The meeting in Paris in November 1981, organized by the Brussels *imām*, was co-ordinated with the opening there by Shaykh Ḥarakān of a MWL-sponsored mosque.[89] In his visionary approach, the creation of the European council was but one step toward bringing all Saudi-supported mosques under the supervision of the MWL's Supreme World Council of Mosques, a body established in Mecca seven years earlier.[90]

The second event was a conference of the African Islamic Co-ordination Council, convened in the Senegalese capital of Dakar on 21-23 December 1981. This was one of several continental councils which co-ordinated the work of Saudi-supported Islamic associations and societies. The African council had been established by a conference in the Mauritanian capital of Nouakchott in May 1976, and its secretariat had been set up in Dakar. The decision to reconvene in conference was perhaps a response to rival Libyan activities in Muslim West Africa, and particularly those of the Tripoli-based Islamic Call Society (see above). Senegal, which had severed relations with Libya in June 1980, provided a congenial setting.

Plans for the Dakar conference were drawn up by Mustafa Cisse, chairman of the African council's executive committee, and Senegalese Ambassador at

Jidda.[91] The event enjoyed the patronage of Senegal's President, Abdou Diouf. Shaykh Ḥarakān apparently had hoped that the conference would develop into a Muslim mini-summit, also attended by the Heads of State of Mauritania, Guinea, Niger, Nigeria and Mali.[92] In the end, the organizers had to settle for official participation at ministerial and ambassadorial levels. The conference resolved on a number of measures for the diffusion of Islam and to counteract Christian missionary activities.[93]

It was not possible to measure the significance of either of these two events on very different frontiers of Islam. They serve to exemplify the sorts of endeavours in which the MWL and Shaykh Ḥarakān were so deeply involved. The techniques were those of gradual persuasion and material enticement which left behind no dramatic headlines.

NEW INITIATIVES IN ISLAMIC FINANCE AND PUBLISHING

Other Saudi activity was conducted without the mediation of the MWL. Government Ministries and agencies, companies, banks, universities and individuals also initiated Muslim involvement abroad. Two recent examples were of broader significance—one from the world of finance, and the other from the field of publishing.

In June 1981, Prince Muḥammad al-Faysal Āl-Sa'ūd announced the establishment of a $1 bn investment holding company, Dar al-Maal al-Islami (DMI; elsewhere, Islamic Finance House). The purpose was to "provide the opportunities to Muslims to perform their transactions in accordance with the rulings of the Islamic *sharī'a*," which prohibits the payment of fixed interest.[94] The projected capitalization was the largest of any Islamic bank, with the exception of the ICO-affiliated and government-financed Islamic Development Bank. The new holding company, incorporated in the Bahamas and managed from Geneva, would establish 26 investment companies, 28 banks and 20 "Islamic solidarity [insurance] companies" over five years. During the Summer of 1981 the initial issue of $250m was offered privately to large investors. In the Autumn, the remaining $750m was opened for public subscription to small investors.[95] For the individual Muslim investor and the entrepreneur in need of capital for ventures in accord with Islamic principles, the DMI has become the market leader in Islamic banking.

The publishing venture was the launching in London in October 1981 of a weekly magazine, *al-Muslimūn*. This full-colour periodical set new technical and professional standards in the field of Islamic publishing. At the same time, its contents and editorial line subtly evidenced a Saudi orientation, too much so for the taste of a rival Iranian publication which claimed that *al-Muslimūn* was CIA-financed to promote "American Islam."[96] In fact, *al-Muslimūn* was published by the Saudi Research and Marketing Company in co-operation with the Jidda-based Tihāma advertising and public relations agency. The latter also played a major role in the establishment, in March 1982, of the World Islamic Institute for Publishing and Distribution at Mecca. The Institute, capitalized at SR100m, planned to finance the publication of Muslim books, periodicals and newspapers, as well as the production of films, television programmes and videotaped cassettes of Muslim content.[97]

The concentration of Islamic banking and publishing in Saudi hands served their vision of Islam. Saudi standards and practices stood to prevail in both these expanding fields for no other country had any comparable instruments as yet. The Saudis' Muslim missionary, philanthropic, financial and publishing activities, made possible by their unmatched material resources, assured that their voice would be more audible than that of their rivals.

THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION'S PREDICAMENT

While rival Muslim States argued their differences through the Winter of 1981-82, the organization which in principle united them prepared for a new round of diplomacy. By the end of January 1982, the ICO Secretary-General, Chatti, had recuperated from surgery and was ready to return to the arena. His first task was to remind ICO member states of the obligations which they had accepted during the intensive conference diplomacy of the previous year.

OUTSTANDING DEBTS

At the Tā'if Islamic summit conference of January 1981, member-states had made various financial commitments. The most far-reaching had stemmed from the proposal by then Crown Prince Fahd, that ICO member-states allocate $3 bn to support development programmes in the Islamic world. He had himself opened the bidding with a Saudi pledge of $1 bn. According to Saudi sources, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates each immediately pledged $500m, and Qatar pledged $300m, bringing total pledges to $2,300m. (On the financial provisions, see *MECS* 1980-81, pp. 132-3.) But in March 1982, Chatti revealed that "no determination was made as to how these funds would be used, how they would be raised or who would carry out the matter." The Saudis and Kuwaitis kept their pledges, but "we did not receive anything from any other Gulf country."[98]

Yet even in austere times, there were three new projects which Chatti was determined to implement—in each case with a minimal initial budget. They were the Islamic Education, Science, and Culture Organization (ISESCO), established at a conference of Muslim Education and Culture Ministers held in Fez on 3-4 May 1982;[99] the Islamic Centre for the Development of Trade; and the Islamic Foundation for Science, Technology and Development. "We do not want to increase the [subsidiary] organizations all at once," said Chatti, "and, God willing, we will devote our efforts this year to these three organizations only."[100]

MUSLIM MEDIATIONS

With his return to diplomacy, Chatti engaged in several major mediation efforts. In March 1982, the Philippines' President, Ferdinand Marcos, paid a state visit to Saudi Arabia to improve bilateral relations and to seek a settlement of the decade-old war between his central government and the Muslim Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) on Mindanao. The ICO's position on this war had not changed since 1974; it favoured a peaceful and just solution to the plight of Filipino Muslims, within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines. This was interpreted as autonomy for the Muslim minority, a principle embodied in the 1976 Tripoli agreement between Marcos and the MNLF. But, by 1979, the agreement had broken down as each side charged the other with violations, and in 1981 the war reached new heights of brutality.[101]

Chatti invited the MNLF leader, Nur Misuari, to Saudi Arabia in the hope that he might meet Marcos. But when Misuari arrived from his Libyan exile, Chatti found that both sides had set "irreconcilable terms," and concluded that a meeting between them "had no chance of yielding results." In Chatti's assessment, Marcos had not fulfilled all the autonomy provisions of the Tripoli agreement, but the MNLF's demand for statehood impeded all progress.[102]

Chatti was deeply involved in another mediation—between the two ICO members, Iran and Iraq. The ICO's credibility was inextricably bound up with their war. "The ICO still has a long way to go," King Fahd reflected in July 1982. "It has achieved only its first phase. Had it reached that advanced position of power,

which we wish it to attain, the war between the two sister countries of Iran and Iraq would not have erupted."[103]

Chatti seemed driven by the conviction that the war could not last that much longer, and after his return to Jidda he began what amounted to continuous mediation. (For details, see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian war.) At one point, Chatti employed the unusual technique of threatening both sides with the public exposure of their modes of negotiation:

> We informed both sides . . . that for now we are operating in secret, and have not released any information. But if we do not achieve a positive result by the next Islamic summit conference [Morocco, Winter 1983-84], we will submit a report with everything in the minutest detail.[104]

But even setting this deadline did not aid the process. If there was anything positive in these negotiations, it was that both warring parties appeared to trust Chatti. This was of special importance in the case of Iran. During the previous year, Iran had allowed demonstrations to greet the committee on arrival in Tehran, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry once made Chatti the target of an abusive statement. Chatti, for his part, now found it easier to determine Iran's precise negotiating position than in the days when Bani Sadr and Raja'i had expressed conflicting views on Iran's terms[105] (see *MECS* 1980-81, p. 134). But to all intents and purposes, these rounds of negotiation were failures.

THE PROPOSED SUMMIT

The commitments made to the cause of Palestine at the Tā'if Islamic summit conference had led one of Yāsir 'Arafāt's aides to proclaim that "if we get one tenth of the promises, it will change our position in many good ways." The member-states were formally agreed upon *jihād* for the deliverance of Jerusalem and the restoration of Arab territories. That resolution had stressed that "*jihād* has an Islamic meaning which is not open to interpretation or misunderstanding." (On the summit, Palestine, and the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO], see *MECS* 1980-81, pp. 128-9.)

But the ICO secretariat spent much of the year at odds with the PLO, for Yāsir 'Arafāt desired an emergency Islamic summit conference which Chatti was reluctant to convene. The idea was first first circulated in early 1982, after the PLO had convinced Chatti that Israeli annexation of the West Bank and Gaza was imminent. But Chatti feared that "this conference may fail because of the disagreements among the Arabs in it. Arab countries have almost half the seats in the conference. Therefore we would prefer that the Arabs agree on a plan first."[106] In April 1982 'Arafāt appealed directly to King Khālid to convene an emergency summit after an Israeli gunman had entered the Aqsā mosque precincts in Jerusalem to kill and maim (see chapter on Israel). Khālid chose instead to appeal for a one-day solidarity strike throughout the Muslim world.[107]

Following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982, it became impossible for the ICO secretariat to resist the Palestinian demand. 'Arafāt appealed to Chatti from besieged Beirut and Chatti, in turn, called upon member-states to participate in a preparatory Islamic Foreign Ministers' conference in Tunis from 17-18 July 1982.[108] But the differences which Chatti had anticipated surfaced, and four days before the scheduled conference, he was forced to postpone it for lack of a quorum.[109] An indignant 'Arafāt wired Chatti:

> It would have been possible to convene this conference for those who wished to attend . . . In view of the massacres and crimes that have been perpetrated by the Zionists against the Lebanese and Palestinians, I am still waiting for practical steps on your part under the present bitter circumstances.[110]

A full two weeks later, Chatti had secured the agreement of only 26 States, still two short of a quorum.[111] The emergency Islamic summit conference was never convened.

THE NIAMEY FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE

As the PLO was engaged in evacuating Beirut, Muslim Foreign Ministers met at their regularly scheduled annual conference in Niamey, capital of Niger, from 20-27 August 1982.[112] This was a congenial setting both for Saudi Arabia and the ICO. Niger, bordering on Libya and mindful of the Chadian experience, had sought in Saudi Arabia a counterweight to a perceived threat of Libyan subversion.[113] In November 1981, the ICO had signed a formal agreement with Niger for the construction of West Africa's largest Islamic university 60 kms from Niamey. Saudi aid predominated in this $60m project, which was intended to amplify a Saudi interpretation of the faith in a region where Libya enjoyed the advantage of proximity.[114] In March 1982, Niger's President Seyni Kountché paid a state visit to Saudi Arabia[115] at the height of the Saudi-Libyan campaign of mutual insult (see above).

Libyan participation in an ICO Foreign Ministers' conference in Niamey thus posed a problem for Libya and Niger alike. On arrival, the Libyan delegation was apparently subjected to a search by the authorities, and so departed in a huff before the opening of the conference.[116] Libya charged that the search violated the ICO charter, and "confirms that the Saudis have bought out the Kountché regime."[117] Saudi Press commentary welcomed the Libyan withdrawal as a "healthy sign" that would contribute to "arriving at a single Islamic view."[118] Chatti diplomatically regarded this as a "bilateral issue" between Libya and Niger, and expressed regret at the "absence of any member-state, whoever it is."[119]

With this issue settled, albeit inelegantly, Chatti's aim was to establish that the ICO member-states had not abandoned the Palestinian cause. Hovering over the deliberations was the ICO membership's failure to satisfy 'Arafāt's request for an emergency Islamic summit during the siege of Beirut. As a step toward the restoration of confidence, the conference resolutions offered the PLO two specific commitments.[120] First, it was resolved to open an ICO office in Jidda for the boycott of Israel, within three months. Such a recommendation had been passed by the Islamic summit over a year before, but had not been implemented despite talks between the ICO secretariat and Arab boycott officials.[121] Second, the conference promised to attach a military bureau to the ICO secretariat to meet the PLO's requirements for military expertise and equipment. This proposal had figured in the Tā'if Islamic summit's "action plan," but had not appeared in the summit resolutions or recommendations. (On the proposal, see *MECS* 1980-81, pp. 125, 129.) A secret resolution reported to have been passed at the Jerusalem Committee's May 1982 session in Ifrane, Morocco, raised the issue again. It was suggested that the military bureau be directed by a Muslim personality knowledgeable in military affairs, and with the specific task of aiding the PLO.[122] At Niamey the proposal finally won open ICO endorsement, although the method of implementation remained uncertain.

Chatti made little attempt to heal the wounds inflicted by what he termed "the

other tragedy," the Iraqi-Iranian war. The parties could not be reconciled in secret negotiations, and the chances of a settlement in a public forum were nil. Iranian and Iraqi delegates abused one another at the opening session,[123] and Iran expressed its formal reservations about the conference resolution calling for an immediate end to hostilities.[124] Nor was any progress made on the forgotten issue of Afghanistan. A spokesman of the Afghan resistance was allowed to address a closed session.[125] (On the removal of the Afghan war from ICO deliberations, see *MECS* 1980-81, pp, 119-21, 129-30.)

This was not a good year for diplomacy. The ICO had fared better than comparable organizations, such as the OAU, in the face of deep divisions among its members. The differences had not prompted expulsions or withdrawals from the organization. But the ICO was in very real need of a successful example of mediation in the war between Iran and Iraq. In late September 1982, Chatti visited another mediator, President Sékou Touré of Guinea, in Conakry, to plan yet another escape from the labyrinth.[126]

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1982

Iran and Saudi Arabia had failed to bridge their differences during the year, and in the Autumn of 1982 their rivalry threatened once again to spill over into the pilgrimage. To avoid a repetition of the clashes which had marred the pilgrimage of 1981, Saudi Arabia had no alternative but to negotiate with Iran. Since Iranians could not be barred from fulfilling a fundamental religious duty, the Saudis had few cards to play. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Velayati, claimed that Saudi officials in Tehran had delayed receiving applications for visas from Iranian pilgrims so that Saudi Arabia could later plead lack of time and admit fewer of them. But Velayati threatened that unless all 85,000 visa applications were granted, no Iranians would attend at all.[127] Saudi negotiators yielded, but then pressed the Iranian Government to take direct responsibility for the conduct of Iranian pilgrims, which the Iranian Government proved eager to do. Khomeyni appointed Ḥujjat al-Islam Musavi-Kho'ini as his official representative and supervisor of Iranian pilgrims. The selection of Kho'ini, a past mentor of the students who had seized the US embassy in Tehran, would assure the presence in the holy cities of one who spoke with the fullest authority on Khomeyni's behalf, and who could enforce discipline among Iran's pilgrims if he chose to do so.

Kho'ini arrived in Medina on 2 September 1982. He was greeted by Saudi officials and visited by two Saudi Ministers who hoped to ensure that he would exercise a moderating influence.[128] But two days later, Kho'ini issued equivocal instructions to Iranian pilgrims. On the one hand, he subtly criticized Iran's Muslim rivals: "By making use of Muslims' differences, their negligence and the betrayal of a great many leaders of Governments in Islamic countries, America has unleashed Israel." In Khomeyni's name, he declared that "any proposal aimed at recognition of Israel by the Fez conference is condemned." On the other hand, he ruled out public manifestations explicitly for or against the policy of any Muslim Government: "Speeches and slogans should revolve solely around the unity of the Muslims, struggle against America and Israel, and Soviet aggression against Afghanistan. You must avoid giving any other slogans or speeches. Take extreme care and avoid any clash with government officials."[129] Kho'ini thus intended not to prevent political demonstrations, but to organize them in a disciplined fashion and to define their themes. That this was more than the Saudis were prepared to accept became evident from a series of confrontations shortly after Kho'ini's arrival:

- On the evening of 7 September 1982, Iranian pilgrims gathered at the Baqīyah cemetery in Medina, resting-place of many of the Prophet Muḥammad's early disciples. Kho'ini attended, and Arabic slogans against the US and Israel were chanted.[130] There was no police intervention, but the next evening a representative of the Governor of Medina met with Kho'ini to express the Saudi Interior Minister's displeasure. Kho'ini replied that gatherings and "chanting slogans against Israel, America and the Soviet Union are part of our *ḥajj* ceremonies. This has been specified in the decree Imam Khomeyni issued to me and we cannot deviate from it." Iranian pilgrims had caused no disturbance and were under control. Kho'ini ended by claiming that Iran "is now the most powerful and the greatest government in the region. We would like to have good relations with you and our other neighbours. The behaviour of your Government towards our pilgrims this year will show whether you, too, are willing to have good relations or not."[131]
- On 8 September 1982, a group of Iranians near the Prophet's Mosque in Medina spontaneously began to chant slogans and display portraits of Khomeyni. Saudi police confiscated the portraits and dispersed the demonstrators. The Saudi Interior Ministry noted that "Khomeyni's envoy had assured officials that nothing of this sort would happen but, regrettably, his promise was not fulfilled."[132]
- Circulars appeared in Kho'ini's name, inviting all Muslims to join Iranian pilgrims in a "unity march" before Friday prayers in Medina on 10 September 1982. On the afternoon before the march, the Saudi Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Endowments Minister called on Kho'ini and asked him to cancel the event. It would disturb other pilgrims, some of whom might take action against the Iranians. Kho'ini replied that, in ordering the march, he was following a directive from Khomeyni. No Muslim government would be criticized, "but do not expect us not to chant slogans against the US, the usurping Zionism and the occupying Soviet Union." The Iranians had been instructed not to react if insulted or assaulted by the police or others, and responsibility for their safety rested with the Saudi authorities.[133]

  The next day, several thousand Iranian pilgrims gathered in a central square in Medina. Saudi police threw a tight cordon around the marchers who were addressed by Kho'ini. He spoke principally of the need for Muslim unity against American, Soviet and Zionist aggression.[134] According to the Saudi Interior Ministry, these remarks contained "political references that were outside the rites of pilgrimage."[135] Portraits of Khomeyni also appeared toward the end of the demonstration, and the police moved in on a part of the crowd. At least 21 Iranians were arrested, and 18 of these were deported four days later.[136] Kho'ini sent a stiffly-worded complaint to Nā'if about Saudi police brutality;[137] Nā'if sent a formal protest to Iran about the violation of Iran's agreement with Saudi Arabia.[138] Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister informed Nā'if that "what you refer to as an 'agreement' is obviously the result of a misunderstanding and misconception and cannot be correct." In the present dire circumstances, "refraining from holding revelatory demonstrations would be tantamount to ignoring the edicts of Islam and the Imam."[139]

Whatever understanding had been reached was now in tatters, and Iranian sources reported that Saudi police began to show less restraint:

- According to Tehran, on the night of 11-12 September 1982, a group of 72 Iranian Qur'ān reciters in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina were dispersed by Saudi police, who allegedly used water cannons.[140]

- On 14 September 1982, Kho'ini visited the Shī'ī mosque in Medina and its Friday prayer leader. The prayer leader and other mosque officials were arrested by Saudi security agents immediately after Kho'ini's departure, according to Tehran.[141]
- On the night of 16 September 1982, Iranian pilgrims again congregated at the Baqīyah cemetery in Medina for special prayers. According to the Iranian account, Saudi police surrounded the crowd and police cars repeatedly passed through it with sirens blaring. The police finally confiscated the loudspeaker through which the prayers were being recited.[142]
- Kho'ini now issued a protest, claiming that the Saudis had beaten and tortured Iranian pilgrims; that women and even great *'ulamā'* had been abused; and that his own delegation was "surrounded by Saudi police and security agents and every moment they are tightening the encirclement."[143]

A few days later, Khomeyni issued a message to Iranian pilgrims expressing his confidence in Kho'ini.[144] At the same time, Nā'if had concluded that Iranian pilgrims, far from having been restrained by their officials, had been "prodded" by them.[145] The scene was thus set for the final confrontation:

- In Mecca, on 24 September 1982, a large group of Iranians assembled to hear a number of speakers and to demonstrate before proceeding to Friday prayers at the Grand Mosque. This event, organized by Kho'ini, was patterned after the Friday march which had taken place in Medina two weeks earlier. This time, however, Saudi police did not wait for the speeches to begin, but broke up the crowd upon hearing the first slogans. Kho'ini called on the demonstrators to cease shouting such slogans so as not to provoke the police, and to march quietly to the Grand Mosque. But all along the route there were arrests, and it was reported that tear gas and water cannons were used to disperse the crowd. Police then stormed the apartment where the speakers were assembled, seizing Kho'ini and Ḥujjat al-Islam Jannati, a member of Iran's Council of Guardians. Iranian sources spoke of 30 injured and over 100 arrested. Kho'ini and Jannati were detained for several hours and later released.[146] The Saudi Interior Ministry announced that the demonstration was a "violation of the pilgrimage rite and the laws of the country."[147] An Iranian Foreign Ministry statement claimed that "once again, the terrorizing and crushing machine of Saudi Arabia has broken the orderly ranks of unity-seeking Muslims."[148]

With the arrest of Kho'ini, Saudi authorities had admitted the failure of the negotiated understanding. Iran was simply determined to create for itself a preponderant role in the pilgrimage. This aim was served not by silencing Iranian pilgrims but by disciplining and directing their zeal. Saudi police had managed to thwart this attempt only through the use of force and intimidation.

The rival Saudi and Iranian versions of Islam could not be readily reconciled. King Fahd in his captive media was *khādim al-ḥaramayn al-sharīfayn*, servitor of the two holy cities—a title associated with universal pretensions. Khomeyni's disciples proclaimed their leader *imām al-umma al-islāmiyya*, the (spiritual and temporal) leader of the nation of Islam, a title still more audacious. Wherever those exclusive claims touched shoulders, there would be no peace.

Martin Kramer

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. Chatti's interview in *al-Siyāsa,* 29 March 1982.
2. R. Tehran, 6 October—SWB, 8 October 1981.
3. Khamene'i's interview, R. Tehran, 16 October—SWB, 19 October 1981.
4. Chatti's interview with R. Monte Carlo, 13 October—DR, 14 October 1981.
5. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat,* 4 November 1981.
6. Chatti's speech to the Arab summit conference, R. Rabat, 25 November—DR, 27 November 1981.
7. *Al-Jazīra,* 27 December 1981.
8. For names raised in this connection see *NAD,* 11 January 1982.
9. SPA, 5 January—DR, 7 January; *al-Riyād,* 11 January 1982.
10. IRNA, 15 October—SWB, 16 October 1981.
11. 'Alī Shari'ati, *Ḥajj* (2nd ed.; Bedford, Ohio 1978), p. 109.
12. Montazeri's address at Tehran University, R. Tehran, 28 September—DR, 1 October 1979.
13. Resolutions and recommendations as reported by R. Riyadh and SPA, 26 September—SWB, 29 September 1981.
14. Text of Khālid's address, R. Riyadh, 4 October—SWB, 6 October; SPA, 4 October—DR, 8 October; *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī,* 5 October 1981.
15. Nā'if's remarks, SPA, 9 October—SWB, 11 October 1980.
16. *Al-Riyād,* 1 September; *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī,* 7 September 1981.
17. Interview with Assistant Information Minister, *al-Jazīra,* 5 October 1981.
18. R. Tehran in Arabic, 30 August—SWB, 1 September 1981.
19. Commitments summarized in a letter of 5 October 1981 from King Khālid to Ayatollah Khomeyni and confirmed in Khomeyni's reply of 10 October 1981, R. Tehran, 10 October—DR, 13 October 1981; Arabic texts in *al-Nashra al-'Arabiyya li'l-Ḥizb al-Jumhūrī al-Islāmī,* 21 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1401 (19 October 1982). From the point of view of religious law, the start of calendar months is determined by direct lunar observation, and this infrequently had made for discrepancies of date between Muslim territories. Conferences held in Istanbul in November 1978 and March 1979 were to have unified the Islamic calendar, by establishing the lunar sighting at Mecca as authoritative. Nevertheless, Muslims in many territories continue to reply upon local sightings.
20. IRNA, 5 October—DR, 5 October 1981.
21. R. Tehran, 6 September—DR, 8 September; *al-Shahīd,* 23 September; *Sawt al-Umma,* 31 October 1981.
22. *DT,* 25 September 1981.
23. Saudi Interior Ministry statement, R. Riyadh, 26 September—DR, 30 September; *NYT,* 8 October 1981.
24. Saudi Interior Ministry statement, R. Riyadh, 26 September—DR, 30 September. "The satans fear the chants of 'God is great' as much as bats fear sunlight," commented R. Tehran in Turkish, 28 September—SWB, 1 October 1981.
25. IRNA, 4 October—DR, 5 October 1981.
26. IRNA, 5 October—DR, 5 October; *Ettela'at,* 5 October 1981.
27. Riyadh Television, 3 October—DR, 6 October 1981.
28. R. Tehran in Arabic, 5 October—DR, 6 October; *Ettela'at,* 5 October 1981.
29. Saudi Interior Ministry statement, SPA, 5 October—DR, 6 October 1981.
30. Ma'adikhah's statement, R. Tehran in Arabic, 4 October—SWB and DR, 5 October 1981.
31. Text of Khālid's letter, R. Riyadh, 6 October—DR, 8 October; R. Tehran, 10 October—DR, 13 October; *al-Nashra al-'Arabiyya li'l-Ḥizb al-Jumhūrī al-Islāmī,* 21 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1401 (19 October 1981).
32. Text of Khomeyni's reply, R. Tehran, 10 October—DR, 13 October 1981.

In discussing Khālid's letter, Ma'adikhah explained that Iranians had not chanted 'God is great, Khomeyni is great' *(Allāh akbar, Khomeyni akbar)*, but 'God is great, Khomeyni is leader' *(Allāh akbar, Khomeyni rahbar)*. They had not chanted 'There is only one God, there is only one Khomeyni' *(Allāh wāḥid, Khomeyni wāḥid)*, but 'There is only one God, Khomeyni is leader' *(Allāh wāḥid, Khomeyni qā'id)*. *al-Nashra al-'Arabiyya li'l-Ḥizb al-Jumhūrī al-Islāmī*, 21 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1401 (19 October 1981).

33. Rafsanjani's speech, R. Tehran, 11 October—SWB, 13 October 1981.
34. Reuter, 11 October; *JP*, 12 October 1981.
35. R. Tehran in Arabic, SWB, 14 October 1981; *al-Nashra al-'Arabiyya li'l-Ḥizb al-Jumhūrī al-Islāmī*, 21 Dhū al-Ḥijja 1401 (19 October 1981).
36. R. Tehran, 17 October—SWB, 20 October 1981.
37. R. Riyadh, 19 October—DR, 20 October 1981.
38. *Al-Nashra al-'Arabiyya li'l-Ḥizb al-Jumhūrī al-Islāmī*, 21 Muḥarram 1402 (17 November 1981).
39. Ma'adikhah's statement on arrival in Mecca, R. Tehran, 5 October—DR, 6 October; SWB, 7 October 1981.
40. Text of Khomeyni's remarks on the Fahd plan, *al-Shahīd*, 25 November 1981.
41. Editorial report on R. Tehran's international service, SWB, 12 January 1982.
42. *TT*, 7 January 1982.
43. Interview with Ahmad 'Azizi, *al-Shahīd*, 9 December 1981.
44. Ma'adikhah's interview, *TT*, 7 January 1982.
45. Khomeyni's message on the anniversary of his return to Iran, R. Tehran, 11 February—SWB, 13 February 1982.
46. R. San'ā, 29 December—SWB, 31 December 1981.
47. Interview with Bahraini Prime Minister, Shaykh Khalīfa Ibn Salmān Āl Khalīfa, GNA, 13 January—SWB, 15 January 1982.
48. GNA, 17 December—DR, 17 December 1981.
49. Remarks by Saudi Deputy Interior Minister Prince Aḥmad Ibn 'Abd al-'Azīz, R. Riyadh, 13 January—DR, 19 January 1982.
50. Nā'if's interview with *al-Siyāsa*, 28 March 1982.
51. SPA, 21 November—SWB, 24 November; *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 23 November 1981.
52. On observance of the Prophet's birthday, see G. E. von Grunebaum, *Muhammadan Festivals* (London, 1976), pp. 75-78.
53. Montazeri's directive to Ma'adikhah, R. Tehran, 27 November—SWB, 30 November 1981.
54. Khomeyni's speech, R. Tehran, 16 December—SWB, 17 December 1981.
55. Speech to conference by Ḥujjat al-Islam Muḥammad Ḥusayn Fazlullah, *Sawt al-Waḥda al-Islāmiyya*, 30 December 1981.
56. Text of address in *Sawt al-Waḥda al-Islāmiyya*, 30 December 1981; R. Tehran, 10 January—SWB, 12 January; *al-Shahīd*, 20 January 1982.
57. Plan in *TT*, 1 November 1981.
58. Announcement of plan, IRNA, 20 December—SWB, 23 December 1981.
59. *TT*, 7 January 1982.
60. Text of Khomeyni's letter of appointment, R. Tehran, 18 February—SWB, 19 February 1982.
61. *Kayhan*, 1 May—JPRS, 1 June 1982.
62. Ministers' statements in *Kayhan*, 2 May—JPRS, 1 June 1982.
63. IRNA, 4 October—SWB, 13 October; *al-Shahīd*, 25 November 1981; *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, 14 March 1982.
64. VoL, 22 February 1982.
65. Shaykh Qabalān's reply to remarks by the Libyan Ambassador to Lebanon, VoL, 14 December—SWB, 16 December 1981.
66. Article by Sayyid Sadeq Musavi, once an Iranian emissary to Lebanese Shī'īs, *TT*, 30 July 1981.
67. *Al-Mujtama'*, 17 August 1982.
68. Qadhdhāfī's speech, R. Tripoli, 3 March—SWB, 5 March 1982.

69. Text of statement, R. Riyadh, 18 March—SWB, 22 March; *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 22 March 1982.
70. R. Tripoli, 20 March—SWB, 22 March 1982.
71. R. Tripoli, VoAH, 21 May—DR, 24 May 1982.
72. R. Tripoli, 17 April—DR, 22 April 1982.
73. *Al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, 3 June 1982.
74. R. Tripoli, 18 August—DR, 19 August 1982.
75. Qadhdhāfī's speech to conference, R. Tripoli, 18 August—DR, 20 August 1982.
76. Conference resolutions, JANA, 20 August—DR, 23 August; and with full list of world council members, *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, 20 August 1982.
77. R. Tripoli, 18 August—DR, 20 August 1982.
78. Conference resolutions, *al-Fajr al-Jadīd*, 20 August 1982.
79. MENA, 12 December—SWB, 14 December 1981.
80. Account in *al-Ahrām*, 28 December 1981; text of Baysār's speech in *Majallat al-Azhar*, January 1982.
81. *Al-Liwā' al-Islāmī*, 25 February 1982.
82. *May*, 2 November 1981.
83. Full text of press conference on his return from Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia, *Majallat al-Azhar*, June 1981; report on his visit to Saudi Arabia, *al-Ahrām*, 10 January 1982.
84. *Al-Ahrām*, 19 March 1982.
85. *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 2 February 1982.
86. *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 19 October 1981.
87. Ḥarakān's interview, *al-Muslimūn*, 30 April 1982.
88. Accounts of the Brussels Centre's history, *al-Muslimūn*, 4 December 1981; *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 5 April 1982.
89. Accounts of the conference, *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 16, 23 November 1981.
90. Discussion of World Council's history and aims in Ḥarakān's speech to conference, *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 23 November 1981.
91. Account of Cisse's efforts between Nouakchott and Dakar conferences in his speech, *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 3 January 1982.
92. SPA, 6 December—SWB, 8 December; *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 7 December 1981.
93. Conference texts in *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 28 December; *al-'Alam*, 28 December 1981.
94. Announcement of opening of public subscription, *Eight Days*, 7 November 1981.
95. *The Guardian*, *FT*, 11 June; *MEI*, 2 October 1981.
96. *Al-Shahīd*, 25 November 1981.
97. *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 10 March, 12 April, 10 May 1982.
98. Chatti's interview, *al-Siyāsa*, 29 March; KUNA, 29 March—DR, 31 March 1982. As had been rumoured earlier, the Saudis and Kuwaitis had not turned the funds over to the ICO secretariat or the ICO-affiliated Islamic Development Bank.
99. *Al-Muslimūn*, 21, 28 May; text of charter, *L'Opinion*, 6 May—JPRS, 24 June 1982.
100. Chatti's interview, *al-Siyāsa*, 29 March 1982.
101. *FT*, 19 March; *WP*, 31 March 1981.
102. AFP, 25 March—JPRS, 6 April 1982.
103. Fahd's address, R. Riyadh, 23 July—SWB, 26 July 1982.
104. Chatti's interview, *al-Sabāḥ*, 3, 4 April 1982.
105. *Al-Sabāḥ*, 3 April 1982.
106. Chatti's interview, *al-Siyāsa*, 29 March 1982.
107. *Al-Watan*, 13 April; text of Khālid's appeal, 13 April—DR, 13 April 1982.
108. R. Tunis, 5 July—DR, 7 July 1982.
109. SPA, 14 July—DR, 15 July 1982.
110. VoP, 15 July—SWB, 17 July 1982.
111. KUNA, 31 July—DR, 1 August 1982.
112. The conference had originally been scheduled for June, but in April Chatti announced that Niger had requested a postponement until August; R. Cairo, 13 April 1982.
113. On the state of Niger-Libyan relations, see *African Contemporary Record, 1980-81* (ed. Colin Legum; New York, 1981), B560-B561.

114. Details on the agreement in *Akhbār al-'Ālam al-Islāmī*, 16 November 1981.
115. Joint communiqué in *Akhbār al-'Alam al-Islāmī*, 22 March 1982.
116. AFP, 22 August—DR, 23 August 1982.
117. R. Tripoli, VoAH, 21 August—DR, 23 August 1982.
118. *Al-Jazīra*, 25 August 1982. Earlier Saudi press commentary had speculated on the possible expulsion of Libya from the ICO; *'Ukāz*, 19 March 1982.
119. AFP, 22 August—DR, 23 August 1982.
120. Resolutions and recommendations, SPA, 26 August—DR, 27 August 1982.
121. Reports on talks, *al-Siyāsa*, 21 January; *al-Mustaqbal*, 30 January 1982.
122. *Al-Mustaqbal*, 15 May 1982.
123. AFP, 23 August—DR, 24 August 1982.
124. According to an Iraqi source, the Iranian representative walked out of the closed committee session which drafted the resolution; INA, 24 August—DR, 25 August 1982.
125. AFP, 22 August—DR, 23 August; AFP, 25 August—DR, 25 August 1982.
126. SPA, 15 September—DR, 16 September 1982.
127. Velayati's interview, *Ettela'at*, 13 September 1982.
128. Report of meetings, R. Tehran, 3 September—DR, 8 September 1982.
129. Kho'ini's instructions to pilgrims, R. Tehran, 4 September—SWB, 7 September; DR, 8 September 1982.
130. According to R. Tehran, the Fez Arab summit was condemned by a speaker, but the Saudi Interior Ministry denied this; R. Tehran, 8 September—DR, 8 September; SPA, 8 September—DR, 9 September 1982.
131. R. Tehran, 9 September—SWB, 10 September 1982.
132. Saudi Interior Ministry statement, R. Riyadh, 8 September—DR, 9 September 1982.
133. R. Tehran, 10 September—DR, 13 September 1982.
134. Summary of speeches, R. Tehran, 10 September—DR, 13 September 1982.
135. Saudi Interior Ministry statement, R. Riyadh, 10 September—SWB, 13 September 1982.
136. Saudi Interior Ministry statement, 12 September—DR, 13 September 1982. Before their deportation, the detainees began a hunger strike; *Kayhan*, 15 September 1982.
137. Text of Kho'ini's protest, R. Tehran, 12 September—DR, 13 September; *Kayhan*, 12 September 1982.
138. R. Tehran, 12 September—DR, 13 September; R. Tehran, 15 September—DR, 16 September 1982.
139. R. Tehran, 15 September—DR, 16 September; SWB, 17 September 1982.
140. R. Tehran, 12 September—DR, 13 September 1982.
141. R. Tehran, 16 September; R. Tehran in Arabic, 16 September—DR, 17 September 1982.
142. R. Tehran, 17 September—DR, 21 September 1982.
143. R. Tehran, 16 September—DR, 18 September 1982.
144. Khomeyni's message, R. Tehran, 20 September—SWB, 22 September 1982.
145. Nā'if's interview with Riyadh Television, 21 September—DR, 28 September 1982.
146. R. Tehran, 24 September—DR, 24 September; IRNA, 24 September—DR, 27 September 1982.
147. Saudi Interior Ministry statement, R. Riyadh, 24 September—DR, 24 September 1982.
148. Iranian Foreign Ministry statement, R. Tehran, 24 September—DR, 27 September 1982.